We consider weakly-verifiable puzzles which are challenge-response puzzles such that the responder may not be able to verify for itself whether it answered the challenge correctly. We consider k-wise direct product of such puzzles, where now the responder has to solve k puzzles chosen independently in parallel. Canetti et al have earlier shown that such direct product puzzles have a hardness which rises exponentially with k. In the threshold case addressed in Impagliazzo et al, the responder is required to answer correctly a fraction of challenges above a threshold. The bound on hardness of this threshold parallel version was shown to be similar to Chernoff bound, but the constants in the exponent are rather weak. Namely, Impagliazzo et al show that for a puzzle for which probability of failure is δ, the probability of failing on less than (1 − γ)δk out of k puzzles, for any parallel strategy, is at most e −γ 2 δk/40 . In this paper, we develop new techniques to bound this probability, and show that it is arbitrarily close to Chernoff bound, i.e. e −γ 2 δk/2 . We show that given any responder that solves k parallel puzzles with a good threshold, there is a uniformized parallel solver who has the same threshold of solving k parallel puzzles, while being oblivious to the permutation of the puzzles. This enhances the analysis considerably, and may be of independent interest.
Introduction
Consider challenge-response puzzles where the responder may not be able to determine if its answer is a correct response or not, either because the challenge may have multiple correct responses (and the challenger seeks a particular one of those), or because the responder is computationally constrained, e.g. in CAPTCHA puzzles [8] . Such puzzles are called weakly-verifiable puzzles [2] .
In cryptography, and other applications, the challenge-response puzzles are often used to distinguish between a real and fake responder, where the differentiation is obtained by the probability of their solving a randomly chosen challenge. For example, the authentic party may have a probability α of solving the challenge correctly, whereas non-authentic parties may have a probability only β (< α) of solving the puzzles correctly. However, if the gap is not large then direct product, or (parallel) repetition of such puzzles may be sought. Ideally, one would like that if k puzzles are chosen independently in parallel, then the probability of the nonauthentic party solving all puzzles correctly is at most β k [2] . Unfortunately, this also makes the success probability of the authentic party go down (if α < 1).
In [4] , the authors observe that the authentic party is on average expected to solve αk puzzles, and if a Chernoff-like bound holds, then the probability of fake parties solving αk puzzles may go down exponentially. They show that their intuition is correct, and indeed give an exponential bound. However, the bound they obtain has a weak constant in the exponent. In particular they show that (setting δ = 1 − β) the probability of the non-authentic party responding incorrectly to less than (1 − γ)δk puzzles (out of k parallel puzzles) is at most e −γ 2 δk/40 . For real problems like CAPTCHA, the 1/40 factor in the exponent is debilitating, and the authors mention it as an open problem to improve this constant.
As is to be expected, the result in [4] is proved by reducing a single puzzle instance to a (simulated) direct product puzzle instance. However, multiple simulations are required to get a good reduction. The complication in analyzing the reduction then stems from the fact that the given single puzzle instance must be embedded in all simulated direct product puzzle instances, and hence they are not independent. In [4] , the authors use a nice duality property of good (bi-partite graph based) samplers to analyze the dependent simulations.
In this paper we develop further new techniques to analyze this probability and show that one can indeed bound the probability arbitrarily close to as in Chernoff bound. In particular we upper bound the above probability by about e −γ 2 δk/2 .
We show that a uniformized parallel solver, which first permutes its given kpuzzles randomly, solves them as before, and permutes the results back, has the same probability of success as before. However, this uniformized solver is much easier to analyze. While this in itself, when plugged into the "trust reduction" strategy of [4] gives better bounds than before, to get the bounds similar to Chernoff bound we need further new techniques. In particular, while a count of other simulated puzzles being answered incorrectly gives a good guess of whether the given puzzle may be answered incorrectly, a linearly weighted metric we consider leads to more optimal bounds.
While the idea of uniformized parallel solver also applies to Raz's Theorem [7] , in particular because of Holenstein's observation that the two provers can use shared randomness [3] , it is to be seen if it leads to improved analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe a result about samplers which we employ, as well as give definitions of threshold weaklyverifiable puzzles. In section 3 we consider uniformized parallel solvers and give the main technical lemmas. In section 4 we give the main theorem and its proof. In section 5 we describe the pre-processing phase.
Preliminaries

Basics
Lemma 1 [Chernoff Bound [1] ] Let X = (X 1 + X 2 + ... + X n )/n, where the X i are mutually independent indicator random variables, each with mean µ. Then, for
Samplers
Consider bipartite graphs F = G(L ∪ R, E). We allow graphs with multiple edges. For a vertex v of G, we denote by N G (v) the multi-set of its neighbours in G. When the graph G is clear from context, we will drop the subscript G, and simply write N (v). We say that G is bi-regular if the degree of each vertex in L is same, and the degree of each vertex in R is same.
We will employ the following lemma from [5, 4] . It says that for any two large vertex subsets W and F of a sampler, the fraction of edges between W and F is close to the product of the densities of W and F .
is a λ-sampler. Let W ⊆ R be any set of measure at least τ , and let V ⊆ L be any set of measure at least β. Then, for all 0 < ν < 1 and λ 0 = λ(β, ν), we have
where the probability is over first picking x uniformly from L, and then picking y uniformly from N (x).
We will also need the following observation from [4] , which shows that the direct product is an extremely good sampler. Consider the following bipartite graph G = G(L ∪ R, L): the set of left vertices is the set of n-bit strings {0, 1} n ; the right vertices R are a pair r, c , where r range over all k-tuples of n-bit strings {0, 1} nk , and c range over m-bit strings {0, 1} m ; for every y = (r 1 , r 2 , ..., r k ), c ∈ R, there are k edges (y, r 1 ), (y, r 2 ),...,(y, r k ) in E.
Lemma 3 [4] The graph G defined above is a λ-sampler for λ(µ, ν) = e −ν 2 µk/2 .
2.3
Weakly-Verifiable Puzzles Definition 1.
[2] A weakly-verifiable puzzle P = (C, R, d(n)), with security parameter n, consists of a polynomial time computable function C, a polynomial time computable predicate R, and a polynomial d(n). For any functions t(n) and c(n), the (t(n), c(n))-value (failure value) of the puzzle is
where the minimization is over t(n)-computable randomized algorithms X using c(n) bits of randomness.
For a parameter δ, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, we say that a puzzle P is (δ, t(n), c(n))-hard if the (t(n), c(n))-value of P is at least δ. In other words, every algorithm X running in time t(n), and using c(n) bits of randomness, has probability at least δ of answering the puzzle wrong.
Definition 2. The k-wise direct product P k of a weakly-verifiable puzzle P = (C, R, d(n)) is the weakly-verifiable puzzle (C k , R k , kd(n)), where C k ( r 1 , ..., r k ) is defined to be (C(r 1 ),..., C(r k )), and
For any parameters ν and δ, 0 ≤ ν, δ ≤ 1, and any functions t(n), c(n), the puzzle P k is said to be ν-approximate (δ, t(n), c(n))-hard if the following minimum probability
is at least δ, where the minimization is over all randomized algorithms X running in time t(n) and using c(n) bits of randomness. Note that X here takes k puzzles and returns k answers, X 1 , ..., X k . Such an algorithm X will be referred to as a k-parallel solver.
Uniformized Parallel Solvers
Given a k-parallel solver X, we consider its uniformized version X, which first randomly permutes its given k puzzles, solves them using X, and permutes back the results. In other words, for all i = 1..k,
where π is any permutation of [1.
.k].
It is easy to see that the "failure value" of the uniformized parallel solver remains the same, as the following shows.
where the last equality follows because r 1 ,...,r k are chosen independently and identically. Thus, without loss of generality, we can consider only uniformized parallel solvers.
Notation.
Let us fix a parallel solver X, and its uniformized parallel solver X. We will use the following shorthands to denote some useful quantities and predicates. Let C k ( r, π) denote C(r π (1) ), ..., C(r π(k) ) . Thus, C k ( r, 1) (where 1 is the identity permutation) just denotes C(r 1 ), ..., C(r k ) . Given the randomness r 1 , ...r k to generate the k puzzles, and the randomness s, π used by X, define random variables
From now on, unless otherwise stated, all probabilities will be over r 1 , ..., r k each chosen uniformly and independently from U d(n) , s chosen uniformly (and independently) from U c(n) , and π chosen uniformly (and independently) from all permutations of [1. .k]. Further, define
• Let τ = (1 − γ)δk.
• Define P = t≤τ p t .
• In the following, we use a positive integer d which we will fix later. This d is clearly unrelated to the polynomial d(n) above in the definition of weaklyverifiable puzzles.
•
Proof: We first show that for any t, 0 ≤ t ≤ k, and any subset Γ of [1.
.k] of size t, the probability of pattern(X, Γ) is a function only of t, and is independent of the subset Γ.
Indeed, consider Γ, and another subset Γ ′ of size t, and let σ be any permutation of [1. .k], such that Γ ′ = σ(Γ) (a permutation applied to a subset Γ just yields the set which is the range of the permutation with domain Γ). It is clear that such a permutation exists. Then,
Now, denote r σ(j) by w j . Then, the above becomes (with probability now over
Since permutations form a group,π is independent of σ, with π chosen uniformly and independently of σ. Then, the above probability can be written as (with probability now over
Since, w 1 , ..., w k are chosen identically and independently, the above remains same even when the probability is considered over w 1 , ...w k , s,π. This proves that the above probability is a function only of t, and independent of the particular subset Γ. Now,
Proof: First note that, for t < k,
The lemma follows easily from this observation.
Lemma 6 For any
Proof: For any j, j < i, we first note that Lemma 5, along with the hypothesis of the lemma for j, yields (by simple manipulation)
The base case, i.e. i = 1, follows immediately from this by considering j = 0. Now suppose the induction hypothesis holds for i, and we will prove the lemma for i + 1.
The antecedent for i + 1 completely yields the antecedent for i ′ < i + 1. Thus, inequality (1) holds for all such i ′ .
Let Ψ(j) stand for (ψ j − j k )( k τ +j ). Then by inequality (2), and plugging in inequality (1) for each p τ +j (j < i + 1), while noting that ψ j is an increasing function of j, we get that p τ +i+1 is greater than
Lemma 7 For 0 < γ < 1, and for any positive integer t < γδk ( = M ),
Proof: From the definition of ψ j , the product can be written as
It is an easy exercise to show that e −z ≥ 1 − z, for 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. Since 0 < γ < 1, and d > 0, as well as 0 < θ j < 1 for each j < M , it follows that
The lemma follows easily from this.
Finally, we need the following simple calculation. Define
Lemma 8 Let M = ⌈γδk⌉, and suppose δk ≥ 1.
1. For any i, 0 ≤ i < M , and for any χ ≥ 1,
The detailed calculations can be found in Appendix A.
The Main Theorem
Theorem 9 Let P = (C, R, d(n)) be a weakly-verifiable puzzle that is (δ, t(n), c(n))-hard. Let k be any positive integer such that δk ≥ 1, and γ (1 > γ > 0) be arbitrary. Further, let ǫ 0 be any arbitrary positive real, d be an arbitrary positive integer, and let
Then the direct product puzzle
In the following let ǫ 1 = ǫ 2 = ǫ 3 = ǫ 0 /6. Recall the definitions of τ , P , and ψ j from Section 3. Let d > 0 be such that γ d+1 < min(1/10, 1/(γδk)).
Consider, for contradiction sake, a k-parallel solver X which for the k-wise direct product P k has (1 − γ)δ-approximate (failure) value less than 1 − ǫ, i.e P = Pr
As explained earlier in Section 3, we consider its uniformized version X, which has the same failure value (1 − P ). Using X as an oracle, we will give an algorithm Y to solve the underlying puzzle P with failure value less than δ, leading to a contradiction.
The algorithm Y will have a pre-processing phase (i.e. independent of the given target puzzle instance x, and function of security parameter n), where it runs some statistical tests using X to determine the appropriate algorithm C If no output is produced in these T iterations, return ⊥.
On input x, choose k−1 random tapes α 2 , ..., α k uniformly and independently from {0, 1} d(n) . Let x 2 , ..., x k be the corresponding puzzles, i.e. x l = C(α l ), for l = 2..k. Setx = x, x 2 , ..., x k . Run X onx. Check if others ≤ τ + i, and if so return X 1 (x); otherwise return ⊥.
The pre-processing phase η returns η(X, n, δ, γ, k), a value between 0 and M − 1. When it is clear from context, we just call the value η.
The event valid stands for the following being satisfied by the returned η:
We will later bound the probability of valid not happening by ǫ 3 (lemma 12); i.e. after we describe how the pre-processing works. In rest of this section, we condition on the event valid being true, and we will not mention it explicitly in the probabilities.
We first need to bound the probability of C[η] timing out, i.e. returning ⊥. Note that, C ′ [η] returns something other than ⊥ if (others ≤ τ + η). As in Lemma 5, it is easy to see that the probability of this happening is at least P which is at least ǫ (by hypothesis of the theorem). However, multiple calls to C ′ [η] are not independent, as they all include the query x. However, as shown in [4] , the corresponding graph is a good sampler, and that helps us analyze the probability of C[η] timing out. Of course, we require Lemma 6, and the idea therein of a linearly increasing ψ j , to obtain better bounds.
To this end, we consider a (k-colored) bipartite graph G = G(L ∪ R, E); the set of left vertices is the set of d(n)-bit strings {0, 1} d(n) ; the right vertices are triples ᾱ, s, π , whereᾱ ranges over all k-tuples of d(n)-bit strings, and s ranges over c(n) bit strings, and π ranges over permutations of [k] ; for every y = (α 1 , ..., α k ), s, π ∈ R there are k edges (y, α 1 ), ..., (y, α k ) in E, colored 1..k respectively.
By lemma 3, this graph is a λ-sampler for λ(µ, ν) = e −ν 2 µk/2 .
Corresponding to each (α 1 , ..., α k ) are puzzles (x 1 , ..., x k ). Now, define Good η to be the subset of R (the right vertices) such that X when run on input (x 1 , ..., x k ), with randomness s and π, has the following property
In other words, total(X ) ≤ τ + η. Let the density of Good η in R be g η . We now define H η ⊆ L to be all those vertices α such that α has less than (ǫ ·
) fraction of its neighbours in the set Good η . We will later see in Lemma 11 how H η is relevant, even though C ′ [η] embeds α (or it's x) only in the first position. We can bound the size of H η , just as in [4] , by employing Lemma 2.
Lemma 10 H η has density at most δ − τ /k − ψ η − ǫ 0 .
Proof: Suppose to the contrary, the density of H η is greater than β = δ − τ /k − ψ η − ǫ 0 . Let H ′ ⊆ H η be any subset of density exactly β. Now, by definition of
On the other hand, by Lemma 2, we get that the same probability is at least β(g η − λ 0 )(1 −ν) for λ 0 = λ(β,ν), for any 0 ≤ν ≤ 1. We setν
. If η = 0, then g η = P > ǫ. Otherwise, since event valid is true, we can use Lemma 6 and 7 to get an explicit lower bound for p τ +η , and hence for g η .
Then, using Lemma 8.1, and noting that 1−ν > γ d /2, it can be seen by a simple calculation that β(g η − λ 0 )(1 −ν) is more than βǫγ d+1 (1 − γ)/8e, a contradiction.
Lemma 11 For every α ∈ H η and the puzzle x corresponding to that random α, .k] at random and set x = x 1 , ..., x j−1 , x, x j , ..., x k−1 . Run X onx. Check if others(X, j) ≤ τ + i, and if so return X j (x); otherwise return ⊥.
For each fixed α, the behaviour of C ′ [i] and C ′′ [i] is statistically identical, because placing x in the random j-th place is just a permutation of placing x in the first place, and that the permutations form a group.
Further, picking a color j ∈ [1..k] at random, and then picking α 1 , ..., α k−1 at random and placing α in the j-th place to formᾱ is same as picking a random neighbour of α (random element of N G (α), and note that N G (α) is defined to be a multi-set) 1 . Now, C ′′ [η] returns something other than ⊥ if the neighbour satisfies others (X, j) ≤ τ + η, which is implied by total ≤ τ + η. But, for α ∈ H η , the density of neighbours satisfying total ≤ τ + η is more than ǫγ d+1 (1 − γ)/8e. Hence for such α, the probability of C ′′ [η] returning something other than ⊥ is more than ǫγ d+1 (1 − γ)/8e. 1 This follows formally by noting that
But, the probability of C[η](x), using C ′ , returning ⊥ is same as probability of C, using C ′′ , returning ⊥, which is at most ( 
Proof of Main Theorem: Now we are ready to prove the main theorem. Since there are a potential T attempts by C[η] on x, we call the values returned in the q-th attempt by C ′ [η] q (1 ≤ q ≤ T ). Now, the input x was set by choosing α uniformly from {0, 1} d(n) . Thus,
The first term on the right-hand side is at most δ − τ /k − ψ η − ǫ 0 by Lemma 10. We now focus on the second term.
(by Lemma 11) Finally, by Lemma 12 (of the following section), the probability of η being not valid is at most ǫ 3 , and this leads to a contradiction as ǫ 0 > ǫ 1 + ǫ 2 + ǫ 3 .
Pre-Processing and Hypothesis Testing
As mentioned in Section 4, the algorithm Y first does some pre-processing using algorithm η, and using X as an oracle. The inputs to η are the security parameter n, k, as well as γ and δ. It returns a value η, 0 ≤ η ≤ M − 1 (M = ⌈γδk⌉). As before, let d be such that γ d < 1(γδk).
Before we describe this pre-processing algorithm, we remark that it is intended to compute the smallest j < M , such that Pr[F(X) | others(X) ≤ τ + j] ≤ τ k + ψ j . Now, we had assumed that P > ǫ, and the hypothesis of Theorem 9 assumes a lower bound on ǫ. Then, by Lemmas 6, 7 and 8.2, it follows that if such a j does not exist, then p τ +M > 1, an impossibility. So, letη be that smallest 0 ≤ j < M .
The algorithm η(X, n, δ, γ, k) does the following: where the count is over running X on random and independentᾱ (each in {0, 1} d(n)k ), for a total of N times (N to be determined below). Set η to be the smallest i such that t i < τ /k + ψ i + ǫ 2 /2. If no such η exists then set η = M − 1. Return η.
Lemma 12 There is a polynomial φ, independent of n, such that with N = φ(γδk, ln (1/ǫ 2 ), ln (1/ǫ 3 )), Pr[ not valid ] < ǫ 3
Proof: Clearly, for i =η, the actual conditional probability of F is is no more than τ /k + ψ i . Hence, t i > τ /k + ψ i + ǫ 2 /2 is an exponentially low probability event by Chernoff bound. Now, for some smaller i, if conditional probability of F is greater than τ /k + ψ i + ǫ 2 , then again t i being less than τ /k + ψ i + ǫ 2 /2 is an exponentially low probability event.
